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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine the changes in the Korean health care system invoked by the reform (in the latter part
of 2000) in regard to the separation of drug prescription and dispensation, especially from the point of view of the public–private
financing mix. It seeks particularly to estimate and analyse the relative financing mix in terms of both modes of production
and types of medical provider. The data used to estimate health care expenditure financed by out-of-pocket expenditure by
were sourced from the National Health and Nutritional Survey (conducted by interviewing representatives of households) and
the General Household Survey (a household diary survey). National Health Insurance data, etc. were used to estimate health
expenditure financed by public sources. This study concentrates on the short-run empirical links between the reform and the
public–private mix in finance. The reform increased remarkably the public share in total health expenditure. This public share
increase has been prominent particularly in the case of expenditure on drugs since the reform has absorbed much of the previously
uncovered drugs into the National Health Insurance coverage. However, a higher public share in medical goods than in out-patient
care would raise an issue in terms of prioritization of benefit packages. The five-fold increase in the public share of expenditure at
pharmacies reflects not only the fact that drugs previously not covered by NHI are covered now but also the fact that prescribed
drugs are currently purchased mainly at pharmacies, as opposed to in doctors’ clinics, as a result of the reform.
© 2005 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The appropriate role of public and private fi-
nance/provision in health care has been the subject
of vigorous debate and discussion in many countries
[1–8]. Many developed countries have constructed
public systems pursuing equitable health care. Their
∗ Tel.: +32 33 760 2343; fax: +32 33 760 2519.
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public nature should not necessarily indicate ineffi-
ciency. Our primary concern about the public–private
mix is the development of hybrid solutions capable of
combining the best of public and private sectors in or-
der to integrate equity and efficiency.
In Korea, rapid economic development was paral-
leled by a significant increase in life expectancy and
expanded access to health care. Universal population
coverage by the National Health Insurance (NHI) was
achieved in 1989, only 12 years after its inception. The
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augmentation of benefit coverage, i.e. the range of ben-
efits covered by the insurance package is a continually
advancing process despite the achievement of blanket
coverage of the population. The reform in regard to the
separation of drug prescription and dispensation (SPD
reform) was one of two big reforms that were intro-
duced in July 2000 to the Korean health care system.
The other was the integration of multiple health insur-
ers into a single payer. Despite its significance in the
Korean health care system, the latter is not particularly
related to the change in the public–private mix, at least
in the short run. In this sense, this study mainly focuses
on the SPD reform.
Kang et al. [9] recognized the SPD reform posi-
tively. The report emphasized the definition of the SPD
reform to the extent of creating an ethos of teamwork
and cooperation between the two professions with
each contributing according to their specialist knowl-
edge. Potential effects were also emphasized such as
improving quality of care and achieving cost reduction
by decreasing abuse, over-use, and misuse of medica-
tions among patients and providers. However, Kim et
al. [10] criticized the decisions made by the Korean
government concerning the separation of the roles of
medical institutions and pharmacists for out-patient
care (SMP), differentiating it from the separation of
the prescribing and dispensing roles of physicians and
pharmacists for out-patient care (SPD). Kang et al. [9]
had expected that, by keeping independent ownership
and management between hospitals and pharmacies,
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Better information on the financing of the health
sector is an essential basis for wise policy change in
the area of health sector reform, but not enough infor-
mation exists on the health sector. Analysis of health
care financing should begin with sound estimates of na-
tional health expenditure. In response to the pressing
need for reliable and comparable statistics on health
expenditure and financing, the OECD developed the
manual, A System of Health Accounts (SHA), releasing
the initial 1.0 Version in 2000 [11]. Since its publica-
tion, a wealth of experience has been accumulated in a
number of OECD countries during the process of SHA
implementation. The OECD has performed a project to
implement the System of Health Accounts in member
countries since 2002. Thirteen countries1 including Ko-
rea are now participating in this ‘SHA implementation
project’. The author has been in charge of the construc-
tion of Korea’s health accounts, and the main part of
the results of this study have been shared with other
member of the OECD’s SHA implementation project
[12].
2. Public–private mix in the Korean health care
system
The Korean health care system can be characterized
by private management on the supply-side and mixed
public and private financing on the demand-side. Public
financing of privately provided health services might
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Mhe SMP (institute separation) would remove the
conomic incentives of prescribing unnecessary drugs
rom the physicians’ decisions about medication.
The objective of this paper is to look at what change
he SPD reform has brought about in the Korean
ealth care system, particularly from the viewpoint
f the public–private mix. Of particular interest is to
stimate and analyse the relative mix of public and
rivate sources of financing in terms of both modes of
roduction and types of medical providers. Since the
nception of the reform is such a recent development,
he real impact on the utilization behaviour of the end
sers will become apparent in the years to come. This
tudy focuses on the short-run empirical connections
etween the SPD reform and public–private mix in
nance. The long-term effects will be the subject of a
orthcoming study when sufficient empirical evidence
ecomes available.ave been the prevailing modality in much of Western
urope too, but Korea is extreme in its implementation.
.1. Supply-side
In Korea, private providers are responsible for the
rovision of the greater part of medical services. Private
ospitals and clinics comprise over 90% of the total
umber of medical institutions and hold nearly 90%
f the total number of beds. Additionally over 90% of
pecialist doctors are employed in the private sector.
he provision of private medical facilities has not been
ubject to stringent legislation. The planning of human
esources has not been a direct process in terms of
1 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea,
exico, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
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planned recruitment, etc. Patients are given great free-
dom when it comes to choosing care providers and have
the choice of western or traditional (oriental) medicine.
This makes the consultations per capita high (10.6
visits in 2001), even though the number of practicing
doctors per capita is the second or third lowest among
OECD countries (1.4 per 1000 population in 2001).
Both the number of acute-care beds (5.2 per 1000
population in 2001) and average length of stay (11.0
days in 2001) are higher than OECD averages [13].
This ‘laissez-faire’ policy for the private medical
care sector is sometimes attributed with having been
responsible for the skewed distribution of health re-
sources between different regions, particularly between
urban and rural areas. In Korea, while less than 80% of
the population resides in urban areas, more than 90% of
physicians and hospital beds are concentrated in urban
areas. As in most OECD countries, the government pro-
vides public health services but its role in disease pre-
vention and health promotion remains comparatively
weak.
2.2. Demand-side
Public sector’s involvement on the demand-side fo-
cuses mainly on the medical fee schedule and the list
of NHI benefits. The government has retained practi-
cally sole control over the setting of fees and annual
revisions of fees, although fees are now negotiated in a
legal sense. In this respect, the expansion of coverage
f
o
i
i
w
A
e
m
1
p
i
r
s
h
c
u
N
benefits with high co-payments has continued since
the beginning of the health insurance scheme in order
to ensure universal population coverage without much
of a government burden [14–17]. On the other hand,
the government plays a direct insurance role for the
very poor. The Medical Aid Programme is financed by
the government as part of the public assistance system.
The increase in the range of benefits covered by the
NHI was continuing despite the achievement of uni-
versal coverage of the population. Drugs dispensed at
pharmacies started to be included in the health insur-
ance coverage in October 1989. The number of days
covered by NHI per year was gradually increased from
a maximum of 180 days in 1995 to no limit in 2000. In
1996 high-technology services like CT scanning also
started to be reimbursable.
3. Reform for the separation between
prescribing and dispensing of drugs
3.1. The situation before the reform
The need to promote a professional specialization
of doctors and pharmacists had been debated since
the inauguration of the 1953 Pharmaceutical Affairs
Law. Until the SPD reform in 2000, however, there
was no distinct separation between the doctor’s role
of prescribing and the pharmacist’s role of dispensing
drugs. It was usual for patients to come out of doctor’s
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sor the NHI is closely related to the public–private mix
n the demand-side.
Rapid economic growth in the 1970s enabled the
ntroduction of the first compulsory public health
nsurance scheme in 1977, which covered enterprises
ith 500 or more employees (Medical Insurance
ct). Population coverage was gradually broadened to
nterprises with fewer employees since then: 300 or
ore employees in 1979, 100 or more employees in
981, 16 or more employees in 1983 and 5 or more em-
loyees in 1988. On the other hand, the public health
nsurance scheme was also expanded to include the
ural self-employed, with the government promising to
ubsidise half of the insurance expenditure. The public
ealth insurance system achieved universal population
overage in July 1989, having incorporated the
rban self-employed who were previously uncovered.
onetheless, a policy of low contribution and lowlinicwith drugs dispensed by the doctor. This practice
riginated from the tradition of oriental medicine that
ed to the non-separation of roles in East Asian coun-
ries. When patients visited doctors, they expected to
et some tangible inputs in the treatment process such
s drugs or injections. Doctors had long fulfilled that
xpectation of patients. Doctor’s clinics and hospitals
ncorporated drugs dispensaries, and drugs were pro-
ided by doctors’ assistants, such as nurses or quasi-
urses, under the doctor’s orders.
On the other hand, most Koreans, when they felt
ll but did not have serious symptoms, dropped into a
harmacy. Pharmacists had been able to dispense many
pecialty drugs directly over the counter after hear-
ng patients’ explanations of their symptoms. Drugs
rescribed and sold by pharmacists had been covered
y health insurance, as is the case when doctors pre-
cribe them. Nonetheless, pharmacists did not like to
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sell drugs under health insurance coverage and patients
rarely requested pharmacists for the drugs to be reim-
bursed by health insurance.
As a result of this phenomenon, there was a large
financial interest invested in drugs. There was, there-
fore, competition between doctors and pharmacists for
the sale of these products. Doctors also profited from
the sale of medicines since their costs for the purchase
of these products were appreciably lower than their
reimbursement by the insurer after the sale [18–21].
This was almost certainly a factor influencing their de-
cision to prescribe drugs rather than purely consider-
ing the well-being of their patients. It was professed
by the government [22] that revenue from the sale of
drugs accounted for over 40% of the total income for
doctors’ clinics of internal medicine, family medicine,
dermatology and urology. The balance between expen-
diture at pharmacies and expenditure at doctors’ clinics
shifted in favour of doctors’ clinics during the 1990s.
This suggests that prior to the SPD reform, a greater
share of drugs was dispensed directly by doctors than
by pharmacists.
3.2. Implementation of the reform
The SPD reform was to separate the function of
prescribing drugs from the function of dispensing
drugs, attributing the former exclusively to doctors
and the latter exclusively to pharmacists [18,23]. The
main goals suggested by the Korean government were
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Jung’s government but the government was obliged to
go in this direction due to strong pressure by idealis-
tic NGOs on whom the president had relied heavily
[10,24,25].2
This process of the SPD reform resulted in pro-
longed strikes by doctors who felt that their financial
interests were threatened by the removal of the
margins which the sale of medicines had provided.
Nation wide strikes were made five times, resulting
in paralysis of the entire medical delivery system.
To placate the aggrieved physicians, medical fees
were increased by 41%. The right to administer
injections was returned to doctors in November 2001,
partly due to concerns about the inconvenience to
patients who were required to obtain their injections
elsewhere.3
Following the reform patients were obliged to
take prescriptions from doctors to a pharmacist to
have them filled and paid the pharmacist directly for
the share not covered by insurance. Medicines were
divided into two categories, namely “general drugs”
and “professional drugs”. General drugs can be dis-
pensed by pharmacies without prescription providing
the package remains unopened, whereas professional
drugs (61.5% of the drugs as of 2000) require a doctor’s
prescription. Drugs administered by injection were
excluded from the mandatory separation policy for the
convenience of patients, since their inclusion would
have meant that patients would need to make several
redundant journeys between the doctor’s surgery and
t
o
i
m
p
m
r
t
r
p
o
i
e
t
s
i
is follows: to reduce the over-use of drugs, to im-
rove patient rights to information, and to improve
he efficiency of the pharmaceutical industry and drug
istribution.
According to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law which
as revised in 1994, the SPD reform would be imple-
ented in stages between 1997 and 1999. Although all
oncerned parties agreed in principle about the bene-
ts of functional separation, there was no consensus
s to the actual mechanics by which this would be
chieved. The government decided to proceed nonethe-
ess in 1999, the NGO’s having reached an agreement
ith the medical association that the doctors would
omply with the terms of the reform. ‘Role separa-
ion’ was not the only subject of the reforms. Manda-
ory ‘institute separation’ between medical institutions
nd pharmacies was also put into effect. This was
ot part of the original plan by President Kim Daehe pharmacists in order to obtain treatment. Not all
f the professional drugs are among those covered by
nsurance. For a given prescription, the pharmacist
ay substitute a branded drug for an equivalent generic
2 Since long before Kim’s regime, NGOs which were mainly sup-
orted by the labour unionists, left-wing scholars, and social move-
ent invokers had gradually expanded their areas of operation while
esisting military dictatorship. Under Kim’s presidency, NGOs par-
icipated extensively in the formation of various policies. The SPD
eform was one of them. NGOs showed quite an aptitude for catching
ublic attention and succeeded in focusing it on the undue aspects
f the physicians’ high income particularly due to the unfair earn-
ngs from both selling superfluous drugs within their own clinics and
vading taxes. They normally took an extreme posture such as, in
he case of the SPD reform, inclusion of injection drugs, institute
eparation, complete substitutive dispensing by pharmacists, etc.
3 OECD [26] criticized this as quite a reversal from the reform,
ndicating that over half of the people visiting a doctor received an
njection.
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drug subject to it having been approved following the
requisite bioequivalent tests. Medical institutions were
prohibited from employing pharmacists for out-patient
care or locating pharmacies on their premises. In
addition pharmacies were prohibited from dispensing
prescription drugs without a valid doctor’s prescription.
4. Estimation of public–private health
expenditure in National Health Accounts
4.1. National Health Accounts and public–private
health expenditure
An understanding of the financial dimensions of
health care systems would contribute to health policy
development. For the purpose of health policy analysis,
estimates are most useful when they tabulate all health
spending. The estimates from the National Health Ac-
counts give decision makers an overall picture of the
health sector, showing the division of spending and the
roles of different payers. In addition they provide a con-
sistent foundation for modeling reforms and for moni-
toring the results of modifications in financing and pro-
vision.
OECD [11] provided a framework (System of
Health Accounts: SHA) for a family of interrelated
tables for standard reporting of total health expendi-
ture and its financing in order to enhance their compa-
rability over time and across countries. According to
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types of medical providers can be made only by com-
bining information from various sources. In this case,
data quality is important since poor data, even in a
well-designed framework, would lead to very erro-
neous results. Data on public health expenditure is
quite reliable but the biggest problems arise when
trying to assess the scale and constitution of private
health expenditures. This gap is significant as pri-
vate expenditure, especially household out of pocket
expenditure, is an important source of spending in
countries such as Korea. This expenditure is usually
underestimated.
Household out-of-pocket spending can usually be
estimated from three sources: firstly, a national house-
hold expenditure survey; secondly, a more focused
household health care use and expenditure survey; and
thirdly, reported provider earnings data. The former
two sources are more often used. Provider earnings data
may be sourced from tax records or separate adminis-
trative surveys, but due to under-reporting of earnings
for the purposes of tax returns, this data cannot be con-
sidered to be entirely accurate.
In this study, estimation of out-of-pocket expendi-
ture is made not only from “Report on the Household
Income and Expenditure Survey” by the National Sta-
tistical Office (hereafter, HIE survey) [29], but also
from “Health Care Utilization Survey” in the “Health
and Nutrition Survey” by the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (hereafter, HCU survey) [30]. The HIE sur-
vey is a national household expenditure survey, and is
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hHA, ‘public health expenditure’ indicates ‘health ex-
enditure financed by general government’. Here, the
erm ‘general government’ is used in the same con-
ext as ‘public sector’. This is the classification using
he concept of ﬁnancing agents which refer to the in-
titutions and entities that pay for or purchase health
are [11,27,28]. In this sense, public health expendi-
ure signifies ‘health expenditure incurred by public
unds, which are state, regional and local government
odies and social security schemes’. It does not include
private social insurance”, which belongs to ‘private’
ealth expenditure despite its importance in terms of
ocial function.
.2. Data and estimation
The relative mix of public and private sources of
nancing in terms of both modes of production andsing the diary technique, while the HCU survey is a
ealth-care-focused household expenditure survey, and
s using the interview method.
The sample of the HCU survey is stratified and
elected from all over the country to be representative
f the whole population. In the 1998 survey, 200
locks were taken by systematic random sampling
rom about 220,000 enumeration blocks nation-
ide. About 70 houses were selected in each block
y simple random sampling. Finally, members of
2,189 households were interviewed using struc-
ured questionnaires and information on 39,060
ndividuals was collected. In the 2001 survey, 600
locks were taken by systematic random sampling
rom about 246,000 enumeration blocks nationwide.
wenty-two houses were selected in each block by
imple random sampling. Finally, members of 12,183
ouseholds were interviewed using structured ques-
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tionnaires and information on 37,769 individuals was
collected.
The HCU survey initially identifies health problems
by the use of probing and filtering questions, and then
uses follow-up questions to establish such information
as the name of the disease, health care providers, num-
ber of visits, money paid out of pocket, etc. The data
also provides information about health care used in the
2-week period prior to the interview in the case of out-
patient care and in the previous 12 months in the case
of in-patient care. The expenditure of a health con-
tact constitutes the cost of health care at a particular
provider. The costs for diagnosis and/or treatment and
care taking are included in this expenditure.
The assumption was made that the information from
the HCU survey would be representative of the whole
of the Korean population. For this, besides the method
of stratified random cluster sampling, various weights
were used to obtain nationally representative estimates.
The weights are the inverse of the probability of a
household in the survey district being sampled mul-
tiplied by the response rate of the district.
The estimate from the HIE of each year was used
as the total amount of out-of-pocket payment for each
year, and distributed into providers according to the
relative proportions across providers obtained from the
HCU survey. This means that the share of expenditure
among different providers in the case of the HIE sur-
vey was assumed to be the same as that in the case of
the HCU data. The scale and mode of sampling in the
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the reform. Public health expenditure shared in total
health expenditure increased sharply by 8.3% from
46.3% in 1999 to 54.6% in 2001. On the other hand, the
share by household’s out-of-pocket payment decreased
by 8.1% from 45.1% in 1999 to 37.0% in 2001.
More in-depth observation reveals that the increase
in public share during the SPD reform was mainly
driven by the increase in financing through social
security (5.2 trillion won, 58% of the increase in public
share), including the government’s ‘indirect’ payment
to the providers through subsidizing contributions
for “regional” insurees. The share by social security
increased by 7.2% from 37.2% in 1999 to 44.4% in
2001,4 while the government’s ‘direct’ payment to
the providers did not increase so much (from 9.0 to
10.2%). This is closely related to the reduced share of
household’s out-of-pocket in total health expenditure.
5.2. Public–private mix in the current health
expenditure by modes of production
Table 1 shows that 58.4 and 66.4% of current
health expenditure on in-patient services was financed
through public expenditure in 1999 and 2001, respec-
tively, whereas the public expenditure figure for out-
patient services was 40.5 and 49.1%, respectively.
Of the current health expenditure on drugs, 34.1 and
54.9% were financed through public expenditure in
1999 and 2001, respectively.
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(CU survey indicate that this is probably a reasonable
ssumption. By using the HIE data obtained using the
ear-round diary record for the total scale of out-of-
ocket expenditure, the statistical anomaly caused by,
or example, seasonal factors in annualizing short-term
urvey estimates could be avoided. In addition, the rel-
tive proportions of expenditure across providers in the
998 HCU survey were applied to the 1999 survey in
he same manner.
. Results
.1. Public–private mix in the total health
xpenditure
Fig. 1 shows who the financiers of total health ex-
enditure were and in what proportion before and after.3. The public–private mix in the current health
xpenditure by types of providers
As shown in Table 2, 51.4 and 58.5% of the current
ealth expenditure in hospitalswere public expenditure
n 1999 and 2001, respectively. In the case of doctor’s
linics, 56.3 and 66.1% were financed through public
xpenditure in 1999 and 2001, respectively. Of the cur-
ent health expenditure at pharmacies, 12.3 and 64.3%
ere financed through public expenditure in 1999 and
001, respectively.
4 Government subsidy to National Health Insurance (for “regional”
nsurees contributions) in the ratio of the total health expenditure
ncreased by 3.4% from 4.8% (1.17 trillion won) in 1999 to 8.2%
2.63 trillion won) in 2001.
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Fig. 1. Financing components of total health expenditure in 1999 and 2001.
6. Discussions and conclusion
6.1. Public–private mix in the total health
expenditure
As shown in Section 5.1 of the results, the public
health expenditure shared in the total health expen-
diture increased sharply by 8.3% before and after
the reform. Since there is no other particular reason
than the SPD reform why such a big change in the
public–private mix occurred in between,5 these results
suggest that the SPD reform has changed the financing
structure of total health expenditure so that public
coverage of the Korean health care system, mainly of
the NHI scheme, is augmented markedly compared
to before. How this increase in public share relates
to changes in prescription and dispensation will be
explained later when discussing the public–private mix
in current health expenditure, which is quite similar in
financing construction to total health expenditure.
5 There were two big reforms to the Korean health care system in
2000. One is the SPD reform and the other is the integration of mul-
tiple health insurers into a single payer. The latter is not particularly
relevant to the change in the public–private mix, at least in the short
run.
Previously, Korea belonged to the lowest public
share group across the OECD countries, together with
the US and Mexico. Now, after the SPD reform, Korea
has moved into the second lowest group, with Switzer-
land and Greece (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, Korea’s public
financing share of 54.6% is low by the standards of
OECD countries. It is still the fourth lowest share after
the United States, Mexico and Greece, and well below
the OECD average of 72.4%. The reason for this low
share is that patients must personally cover the costs not
only of services not covered by the NHI but also a high
percentage of the cost of services provided for by the
NHI. This may be the main difference from the US sys-
tem where private financing is derived from widespread
private health insurance arrangements.
6.2. Public–private mix in the current health
expenditure by modes of production
Current health expenditure shows the change of
health expenditure more directly than the total health
expenditure, particularly in that it is the biggest cate-
gory where all three dimensions of health expenditure,
i.e. functional, financing and provider’s aspects, coin-
cide. Furthermore, it is of more value to look more in
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Table 1
Change in financing components of the current health expenditure by Modes of Production
Before the reform (1999) (billion won, %)
[current health expenditure (total) = 22554]
After the reform (2001) (billion won, %)
[current health expenditure (total) = 30200]
In-patient care
Total 6817 100.0% 7117 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 3984 58.4% 4728 66.4%
Government 593 8.7% 807 11.3%
S. Security 3391 49.7% 3921 55.1%
Private finance
Sub-total 2833 41.6% 2389 33.6%
Private S. Ins. 504 7.4% 673 9.5%
Out-of-pocket 2290 33.6% 1686 23.7%
Others 39 0.6% 30 0.4%
Out-patient care
Total 8873 100.0% 12935 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 3597 40.5% 6353 49.1%
Government 374 4.2% 641 5.0%
S. Security 3223 36.3% 5712 44.2%
Private finance
Sub-total 5275 59.5% 6582 50.9%
Private S. Ins. 17 0.2% 38 0.3%
Out-of-pocket 4829 54.4% 5960 46.1%
Others 429 4.8% 585 4.5%
Medical goods (including drugs)
Total 5445 (4933)a 100% (100%) 8356 (7573) 100% (100%)
Public finance
Sub-total 1686 (1683) 31.0% (34.1%) 4161 (4158) 49.8% (54.9%)
Government 214 (211) 3.9% (4.3%) 397 (394) 4.8% (5.2%)
S. Security 1473 (1473) 27.0% (29.9%) 3764 (3764) 45.0% (49.7%)
Private finance
Sub-total 3758 (3250) 69.0% (65.9%) 4195 (3416) 50.2% (45.1%)
Private S. Ins. 10 (10) 0.2% (0.2%) 4 (4) 0.1% (0.1%)
Out-of-pocket 3749 (3240) 68.8% (65.7%) 4191 (3412) 50.2% (45.0%)
Public Health & Health Administration
Total 1537 100.0% 1793 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 1528 99.4% 1784 99.5%
Government 646 42.0% 976 54.4%
S. Security 882 57.4% 808 45.1%
Private finance 9 0.6% 8 0.5%
a Figures in the parenthesis indicate those on drugs in isolation.
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Table 2
Change in financing components of the current health expenditure by types of providers
Before the reform (1999) (billion won, %)
[current health expenditure (total) = 22671]
After the Reform (2001) (billion won, %)
[current health expenditure (total) = 30200]
Hospital
Total 9739 100.0% 9046 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 5010 51.4% 5288 58.5%
Government 861 8.8% 1039 11.5%
S. Security 4149 42.6% 4249 47.0%
Private finance
Sub-total 4729 48.6% 3758 41.5%
Private S. Ins. 328 3.4% 425 4.7%
Out-of-pocket 4401 45.2% 3333 36.8%
Doctor’s clinic
Total 5664 100.0% 7436 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 3188 56.3% 4917 66.1%
Government 266 4.7% 395 5.3%
S. Security 2923 51.6% 4521 60.8%
Private finance
Sub-total 2476 43.7% 2519 33.9%
Private S. Ins. 202 3.6% 289 3.9%
Out-of-pocket 2274 40.1% 2231 30.0%
Pharmacy
Total 1666 100.0% 5832 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 204 12.3% 3753 64.3%
Government – 0.0% 335 5.7%
S. Security 204 12.3% 3418 58.6%
Private finance (out-of-pocket) 1461 87.7% 2079 35.7%
Others
Total 5602 100.0% 7886 100.0%
Public finance
Sub-total 2393 42.7% 3068 38.9%
Government 700 12.5% 1052 13.3%
S. Security 1692 30.2% 2016 25.6%
Private finance
Sub-total 3209 57.3% 4818 61.1%
Private S. Ins. 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Out-of-pocket 2732 48.8% 4193 53.2%
Others 476 8.5% 624 7.9%
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Fig. 2. Public funding share in OECD countries, 2001. Source: OECD Health Data File 2004 (except both Netherlands from Health Data File
2003 and Korea from the estimation in this study). Note: Figures in 2001 (except Turkey of 2000 figure).
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depth into the current health expenditure in terms of
both modes of production and types of provider.
As shown in Section 5.2 of the results, the public
share in both in-patient and out-patient expenditure in-
creased by 8.0 and 8.6%, respectively, during the period
of the SPD reform. Public share increase in out-patient
expenditure, though it is the case in in-patient expendi-
ture as well, relates to the sharp increase in the doctor’s
consultation fee, which was allowed in order to com-
pensate the margin lost by the prohibition of the sale of
drugs. The margin from drugs was previously not cov-
ered by public finance or NHI, whereas the increase
in the doctors’ consultation fee has been covered by
NHI. In addition to this price increase, there was an in-
crease in the number of out-patient consultations since
the prescription of drugs is preceded by a doctor’s con-
sultation. Although the SPD reform has no direct effect
on in-patent care, fees for in-patient care were inflated
in order to compensate for the loss of revenue which it
caused.
Nonetheless, public share in in-patient expenditure
of 66.4% is still low by the standards of OECD coun-
tries. Across 13 OECD countries participating in the
‘SHA implementation project’, public funds are the
dominant source in financing in-patient care, contribut-
ing 82% of total in-patient expenditure and leaving the
private sector to fund the remaining 18% [12]. Out-
of-pocket payments typically fund around 10% of in-
patient costs in many countries, while they amount to
a quarter of in-patient expenditure in Korea. Korea’s
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this was legally prohibited with the advent of the SPD
reform. Secondly, newly regulated pharmacists fees are
reimbursable under the NHI scheme.
The countries participating in the ‘OECD SHA im-
plementation project’ reported public funds financing
54% of medical goods expenditure on average [12].
Korea became a member of this majority group after
the SPD reform. On the other hand, in most OECD
countries in the ‘OECD SHA implementation project’,
the role of private financing is more significant in the
context of financing medical goods than that of pay-
ing for in/out-patient care. After the reform Korea be-
came an unusual case in that the public share in medical
goods in 2001 was higher than that in out-patient care.
An increase of public financing of drug use would be
desirable to the extent that a substantial proportion of
health expenditure is employed for this purpose. It is
problematic, however, in terms of prioritization of ben-
efit packages that the services covered by NHI are low
cost instead of high cost.
6.3. The public–private mix in the current health
expenditure by types of providers
As shown in Section 5.3 of the results, the public
financing share in current health expenditure increased
with all health care providers during the period of the
SPD reform, especially in the case of pharmacies where
it more than quintupled. The increase in public share
of expenditure at both hospitals and doctor’s clinics
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“ower public share in out-patient expenditure (49.1%)
ompared to in-patient expenditure is congruous with
he tendency across OECD countries in which the role
f public finance is normally less significant in out-
atient financing than in in-patient financing. The coun-
ries participating in the ‘OECD SHA implementation
roject’ reported public funds financing 55% of medi-
al goods expenditure on average [12].
The public financing share in drugs expenditure in-
reased to such an extent as to surpass the public share
n out-patient expenditure. Certain changes help ex-
lain this increase. Firstly, many drugs previously not
overed were incorporated into the NHI scheme. In
ther words, the trend shifted from self-medication to
ormal medication under the auspices of the NHI sys-
em. Whereas patients used to purchase medication at
he pharmacy with the aid of the pharmacist and with-
ut being reimbursed for drugs covered by insurance,an be explained in a similar way to the increase in
he case of in-patient and out-patient expenditure, even
hough the exact mechanism of the flow of money dif-
ers since most hospitals in Korea make a larger share
f their revenue from their large departments of out-
atient care while doctor’s clinics make a minor but
mportant amount of their revenue from their in-patient
epartments.
The five-fold increase in public share of expendi-
ure at pharmacies reflects the fact that drugs previ-
usly not covered by insurance are covered now, as
entioned in the section on Modes of Production, but
t is noteworthy that prescribed drugs are currently pur-
hased mainly at pharmacies as a result of the reform.
he shifting of the dispensing function from doctors
o pharmacists produced a shifting of costs within the
HI accounts from “hospitals or doctor’s clinics” to
pharmacies”.
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As shown in Table 2, the big increase in expenditure
at pharmacies (from 1.7 trillion won in 1999 to 5.8
trillion won in 2001) can be attributed mostly to the
big increase in financing from social security scheme
(from 0.2 trillion won in 1999 to 3.4 trillion won in
2001). Nonetheless, private financing has consistently
increased over the period of the reform (from 1.5 tril-
lion won in 1999 to 2.1 trillion won in 2001). It can
be inferred from this that expenditure at pharmacies
was not subject to a “crowding out” effect.Expenditure
at pharmacies was simply increased by public money,
rather than public money replacing private money.
Despite its increase, the public financing share of
58.5% in Korea’s hospitals is still quite low, compared
with other OECD countries in the ‘SHA implemen-
tation project’, where public funds play the major fi-
nancing role in hospital’s expenditure, and considered
to reflect the private-oriented characteristics of Korean
health care delivery. In general the private sector takes
on a greater share of the financing of ambulatory health
care providers than for hospitals.
The main findings in this study can be summarized
as follows:
(i) The public share increase over the period of the
SPD reform has been prominent in the case of ex-
penditure on drugs, from 34.1% in 1999 to 54.9%
in 2001. This result suggests that the SPD reform
has absorbed much of the previously uncovered
drugs into the National Health Insurance cover-
creased over the period of the reform. It can be
inferred from this that expenditure at pharmacies
was not subject to a “crowding out” effect.
(iii) The SPD reform has augmented the public financ-
ing share in total health expenditure from 46.3%
in 1999 to 54.6% in 2001. This is mainly due to
the public share increase in expenditure on drugs,
but public share increase in both in-patient and
out-patient expenditure at the time of the SPD
reform as well contributed in part to the public
financing share in total health expenditure. Previ-
ously, Korea belonged to the lowest public share
group among the OECD countries, together with
the US and Mexico. Now, after the SPD reform,
Korea has moved into the second lowest group,
with Switzerland and Greece. Nevertheless, Ko-
rea’s public financing share is still low by the stan-
dard of OECD countries.
Any reform results in both positive and negative out-
comes. Negative effects, according to Kim et al. [10],
include increased total cost of the health care system,
resulting in a great deficit in NHI, causing great in-
convenience to patients, worsening access to medical
care, and an increased market share for multinational
drug producers. The positive outcomes of the reform
include: avenues for the professional specialization of
doctors and pharmacists have been opened, and the po-
tential for more informed consumption of drugs has
been created.
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Rage. Korea has become part of the group of av-
erage OECD countries in which public funds fi-
nance more than half of medical goods expendi-
ture. However, a higher public share in medical
goods than in out-patient care would raise an is-
sue in terms of prioritization of benefit packages.
(ii) The public share increase over the period of the
SPD reform has been dramatic particularly in the
case of expenditure at pharmacies, from 12.3% in
1999 to 64.3% in 2001. This reflects not only the
fact that drugs previously not covered by NHI are
covered now but also the fact that prescribed drugs
are currently purchased mainly at pharmacies in-
stead of hospitals or doctors’ clinics as a result of
the reform. While the big increase in expenditure
at pharmacies can be attributed mostly to the big
increase in the financing from the NHI, the scale
of private financing as well has consistently in-From the perspective of the public–private mix, the
PD reform has had a positive overall effect on the Ko-
ean health care system in that it has augmented public
unding. However, the relatively higher public share in
rugs has revealed the problem in terms of prioritiza-
ion of the NHI coverage. The aim should henceforth
e to improve coverage in terms of severe care cases.
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